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Abstract 
 
In this essay I outline some beliefs and practices among 
lowland christianised peoples in the Philippines relating 
primarily to the existence of spirits which are believed to be 
responsible for causing illness, attending to their imbrication 
with Catholicism and local cultural notions and practices and 
post-colonial questions of identity. I sketch three 
interpretative frameworks that have been brought to bear on 
these religious beliefs and practices: an anthropological 
analysis that seeks to explain such beliefs and practices in 
terms of a cultural logic, a socio-historical account in which 
resonances are highlighted between such beliefs and the 
post-colonial question of Filipino identity, and a rationalist 
account in which the utility of such beliefs is assessed, at all 
times highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of these 
different interpretative frameworks vis-à-vis a 
phenomenological approach. I use the empirical material to 
demonstrate that the phenomenological commitment to 
religion as a sui generis phenomenon cannot reasonably be 
said to constitute a satisfactory theory of context and I argue 
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that the phenomenological epochē is an inadequate 
response to the problem of representation. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical debates in the study of religions conventionally 
revolve around arguments about how ‘religion’, as a 
category or object of critical analysis, is to be defined and, in 
consequence, how it should be studied. Paul Ricoeur’s 
contrast between “psychoanalytic interpretation…conceived 
as the unmasking, demystification or reduction of illusions” 
with “interpretation conceived as the recollection or 
restoration of meaning”<2> sets up an opposition between a 
hermeneutics of suspicion on the one hand, and a 
hermeneutics of restoration on the other. Phenomenologists 
of religion, practitioners of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of 
restoration who draw from Husserl’s search for a philosophy 
without presuppositions, have commonly asserted that 
religion is a sui generis phenomenon that must be studied 
on its own terms. Religion is assumed to be an autonomous 
and distinct sphere of human belief and practice concerned 
with relating human beings to a transcendent supernatural 
or sacred reality. For example, Rudolf Otto claimed to be 
conducting an analysis of a “mental state [that] is perfectly 
sui generis and irreducible to any other”<3> while the 
‘numinous’ “states of the soul” to which Otto directed his 
attention were analysed to discover what was “unique in 
them” rather than what they had “in common with other 
similar states”. <4> Similarly, Mircea Eliade claimed that “to 
try to grasp the essence of such a [religious] phenomenon 
by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, 
linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one 
unique and irreducible element in it – the element of the 
sacred”. <5> In other words, both Otto and Eliade attempted 
to render religion as a unique area of enquiry that 
necessitated the deployment of very specific and limited 
methodological tools. Ninian Smart’s position was somewhat 
more nuanced: while advocating the phenomenological 
epochē as a means of entering into the worldview of the 
believer, Smart also argued that the study of religions was a 
field of enquiry open to interrogation by a variety of 
disciplines and methodologies. <6> Indeed, the recent spate 
of publications devoted to re-thinking phenomenology, such 
as those produced by Flood and Cox point to the importance 
of a theory of context to the study of religions though others, 
notably Twiss and Conser, have remained committed to the 
defence of the phenomenology of religion traditionally 
conceived. <7> In this essay I will show that through the 
contextualisation of religious beliefs and practices in culture 
and history, description and analysis is enriched and 
deepened, and that the charge of reductionism often levelled 
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at social scientific approaches is specious. Although 
scholars in the study of religions frequently claim to have 
‘moved on’ from phenomenology, certain key 
phenomenological assumptions continue to play a vital role 
in structuring enquiry about religions, in particular the idea of 
value-neutrality embodied in the notion of the 
phenomenological epochē.  
A related problem, then, with the phenomenology of religion 
concerns its invocation of the Husserlian epochē as a 
means to avoid or rather bracket out values and judgements 
as to the truth or falsity of particular religious beliefs. This 
strategy is aimed at preserving the integrity of a putative 
believer’s point of view, which in turn is to be accessed or 
re-experienced through intuitive or empathic liaison. In the 
essay ‘Guilt, Ethics, and Religion’, Ricoeur outlines a 
phenomenological-hermeneutical method with the emphasis 
placed firmly upon sympathy, empathy and imagination. In 
order not to judge or evaluate that which the 
phenomenologist seeks to describe and understand, the 
phenomenologist must place him or herself in suspense:  
“My point of departure is in a phenomenology of confession 
or avowal. Here I understand by phenomenology a 
description of meanings implied in experience in general…a 
phenomenology of confession is therefore a description of 
meanings and of signified intentions, present in a certain 
activity of language, namely, confession. Our task, in the 
framework of such a phenomenology is to re-enact in 
ourselves the confession of evil, in order to uncover its aims. 
By sympathy and through imagination, the philosopher 
adopts the motivations and intentions of the confessing 
consciousness; he does not “feel” but “experiences” in a 
neutral manner, in the manner of “as if,” that which has been 
lived in the confessing consciousness.” <8> 
Even though Ricoeur is here concerned with understanding 
confession, the methodological steps he outlines are 
generalisable to the phenomenology of religion as a whole. 
As such, Ricoeur’s emphasis on description, re-enactment, 
sympathy, imagination and neutrality constitute the 
distinctive features of the phenomenological method. Yet, if 
carefully reflected on, the epochē renders phenomenology a 
strange kind of positivism: a guarantee of objectivity in which 
some facts are to be separated from some values. It is 
argued that given the irreducibility of religion and therefore 
of the believer’s point of view, the scholar of religion ought to 
be, usually in some vague and unspecified sense, an 
‘insider’ or at least in sympathy with the insider in order to 
properly represent the interiority of ‘the’ religious 
commitment. Religions are as such constituted as 
‘worldviews’ that demand a special hermeneutics, a special 
hermeneutics that is, at the same time, supposed to 
guarantee faithful or accurate representation of particular 
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phenomena and the meanings those phenomena allegedly 
carry for certain people. 
Significantly, the so-called insider-outsider debate in 
religious studies I have alluded to straddles both 
phenomenology and anthropology. <9> In the 
phenomenology of religion this is a debate about the 
objectivity, neutrality and impartiality of the scholar of 
religion, and also a debate about writing and the role of 
writing in evoking, within a putative reader, an ‘experience’ 
of a particular religious practice or belief and the possibility 
of seeing the world from another point of view. For instance, 
Otto self-consciously informed his reader that he would be 
using “analogy and contrast” as well as “metaphor and 
symbolic expressions” in order “to make the states of mind 
[i.e. the states of the religious consciousness]…ring out…of 
themselves”. <10> Similarly, Eliade suggested that  
“a considerable enrichment of consciousness results from 
the hermeneutical effort of deciphering the meaning of 
myths, symbols, and other traditional religious structures; in 
a certain sense, one can even speak of the inner 
transformation of the researcher and, hopefully, of the 
sympathetic reader. What is called the phenomenology and 
history of religions can be considered among the very few 
humanistic disciplines that are at the same time propadeutic 
and spiritual techniques”. <11>  
In anthropology, on the other hand, this has led to debates 
about ethnographic authority, about the imposition of 
Western categories on non- Western ‘others’ and about the 
very possibility of re-presenting itself. <12> 
Yet, the phenomenology of religion as an allegedly 
restorative approach to the study of religion is conventionally 
contrasted with so-called ‘suspicious’ approaches that 
allegedly seek to situate religions within, reduce religions to 
or define them in terms of particular social, cultural and 
historical contexts. <13> This kind of suspicion is typically 
associated with sociology and social or cultural 
anthropology. It is an axiomatic assumption of these latter 
disciplines that human beings are born or thrown into 
languages, cultures, societies and historical moments not of 
their choosing and that, moreover, their immersion in 
cultures, societies, languages and histories necessitates a 
mode of analysis that seeks to go beyond the point of view 
of any putative believer to the structures and systemic 
features that condition and set the limits and parameters to 
being human in any time or place. Importantly, post-modern 
epistemological critiques do not challenge this basic 
assumption – such critiques encourage rather the 
acknowledgement and explication of the fact that disciplines 
such as sociology and social or cultural anthropology are 
themselves products of particular historical and cultural 
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circumstances and that enquiry or questioning also has a 
context. Only recently has this kind of reflexivity become a 
feature of debate in the study of religions. <14> 
In this essay, I will proceed in the following manner: firstly, I 
will sketch some religious beliefs and practices common 
among lowland christianised peoples in the Philippines 
relating to the existence of spirits which are commonly 
believed to be responsible for causing certain categories of 
illness. I will address their imbrication with Catholicism, local 
cultural notions and practices, healing and ritual practices of 
penitence, sacrifice, pilgrimage and practices directed 
towards the accumulation of spiritual power and potency. 
This material comes both from the extant historical and 
ethnographic literature on religion in the christianised, 
lowland Philippines and from field work that I conducted in 
the Tagálog speaking provinces of Quezon and Laguna 
south of Manila in 1999-2000 and 2003. The texts selected 
for analysis and comparison were chosen as broadly 
representative of particular strategies for interpreting not 
only religion in the Philippine context but religions wherever 
they are located temporally or spatially. Secondly, I will 
sketch three different frameworks of interpretation that have 
been brought to bear to understand religious beliefs and 
practices in the Philippines. I will juxtapose an 
anthropological account in which such beliefs and practices 
are contextualised in terms of the local culture, a socio-
historical account in which they are framed in terms of their 
resonance with the post-colonial question of identity and a 
rationalist account in which their utility is assessed, at all 
times highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of these 
different interpretative frameworks vis-à-vis a 
phenomenological approach to religion. Thirdly, I will argue 
that a phenomenological approach to religion cannot 
account for the clear inter-penetration of religion with cultural 
phenomena and historical experiences because of its 
commitment to the idea that religion is a sui generis 
phenomenon. Furthermore, this approach cannot bring itself 
to critique beliefs that are evidently false because of its 
commitment to preserving the believer’s or insider’s point of 
view even to the extent that that point of view may endanger 
the believer him or herself or may be dangerous to others. In 
other words, this paper is ideologically motivated in that the 
intention is to provide clear evidence for the interpretative 
superiority of approaches to religion that take context 
seriously and have engaged in sustained, reflexive 
theorising over the problem of representation. 
CON-TEXT 
Any visitor to the Philippines willing to spend a little time 
each day to watch local television, read newspapers and 
comics, catch a movie or live with a family will soon come to 
be aware of stories about sorcery and witchcraft (kulam), of 
blood-sucking flying bats (aswáng and manananggal), 
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dwarves and elves (duwende), spirits that enchant the 
unwary such as the engkanto and tikbalang, ancestral spirits 
(anito), as well as the pervasive use of creolised prayers that 
combine Tagálog, Spanish and Latin (orasyón) and amulets 
(antíng-antíng) through which to guard against the mischief 
or possible malevolence of these alleged super-natural 
agents or for the accumulation of spiritual power and 
potency (kapangyarihan). These kinds of beliefs and 
associated practices sit beside popular christianised 
practices of healing and pilgrimage as well as more ‘exotic’ 
practices such as self-flagellation and crucifixion.  
I have conducted field research in and around an extinct 
volcano called Mount Banahaw, widely believed by many 
Filipinos to be a source of spiritual power and potency. It is a 
place frequently mentioned in accounts of the 1896 
Philippine revolution against Spain as a site of organised 
resistance – resistance led by local religious leaders. <15> 
Today, it is home to a number of religio-nationalist 
movements that venerate or worship the national hero José 
Rizal.<16> It is a place of pilgrimage particularly during 
Easter when tens of thousands come to visit the various 
shrines on the lower slopes of the mountain and to collect 
allegedly powerful antíng-antíng. In and around Mount 
Banahaw, stories about spirits and about the special abilities 
that certain powerful amulets are said to bestow are 
commonplace. As such, the problem of the interpretation of 
beliefs and practices strange and alien to my own was one I 
needed to address. This was done in the first instance by 
documenting how such beliefs and practices had been 
interpreted by others, through problematising such accounts 
and through comparing them both to one another and to a 
putative phenomenological account. 
RELIGION IN CULTURE 
The emphasis in social and cultural anthropology is on 
societies and cultures as organised if permeable and shifting 
structures of meaning and exchange. The approaches taken 
by Zialcita and Cannell to popular religion in the lowland 
Philippines work on the assumption that Philippine culture is 
structured in terms of a socio-cultural-logic of debt, pity, 
reciprocity and exchange, relationships expressed locally in 
terms of utang na loób or ‘debt from the inside’ and hiyâ or 
‘shame’. Note that for the strict phenomenologist of religion 
this kind of interpretation is inadmissible on the grounds that 
it refuses to treat religion as a sui generis phenomenon.      
In her analysis of peniténsiyá in the Philippines, Zialcita 
argues that Filipino flagellants engage in peniténsiyá during 
Holy Week as a means of re-ordering their relations with 
their kin or as the fulfilment of a promise or vow made to 
God usually vis-à-vis the health of a relative. Interestingly, 
such vows and promises are transferable between or among 
relatives. In other words, the motivations for engaging in 
these different practices are as much cultural as religious. 
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As such, Zialcita argues that these rituals should be 
analysed not merely in terms of their religious content, but 
also in terms of their cultural context, particularly  
“the social and moral orders of a society, the principles 
underlying a society’s organisation, the kinds of corporate 
grouping available, and the norms and values inherent in 
structural relationships…Thus utang na loob or a moral debt 
of gratitude, concern for the welfare of the immediate family, 
and loyalty to the peer group are key organizing principles of 
lowland Philippine society. These are reenacted and indeed 
reinforced by the Lenten rituals.” <17>  
Similarly, Cannell’s analysis of healing in the lowland 
province of Bicol begins by noting the syncretism of healing 
practices. Such practices involve medium-ship, trance and 
possession as well as prayer and devotional practices 
associated with Catholic saints, icons and shrines. In her 
analysis of women healers and their complex relationships 
with the spirits that ‘possess’ them for the purposes of 
healing, Cannell notes the similarity in the rhetoric used with 
everyday talk about marital relationships. <18> Cannell also 
argues – drawing on the writings of Scott and Rafael – that 
the relations between healer, spirit and client and the 
practice of healing itself is understood in terms of local 
notions of debt, pity and reciprocity whereby persons are, as 
it were, continually re-made and re-defined in terms of their 
dealings with persons and entities of higher or lower status 
or that have greater or lesser access to sources of power. 
<19> Indeed, Cannell argues that social relationships 
among lowland Bicolaños (and as such lowland Filipinos 
more generally) are “dynamic engagements” defined by 
attempts to “establish and negotiate relationships with 
various figures of power” where “persons are potentially 
changed in every interaction with others”. <20> 
According to Cannell, then, Bicolaño conceptions of self 
focus on process, mutability, and transformation through 
contact with persons, objects, places, or entities of a greater 
or lesser potency or power. Cannell’s analysis of healing 
therefore rests on culturally specific conceptions and 
practices of personhood and power as a basis for 
understanding popular religious beliefs and practices in the 
Philippines. Critically, when the strategy of interpretation 
adopted by Zialcita and Cannell is compared to a traditional 
phenomenological analysis, the weakness of the latter is 
brought sharply into focus. Zialcita and Cannell demonstrate 
the interpenetration of culturally specific norms, values, 
practices and discourses with christianised religious beliefs 
and practices, an interpenetration that a phenomenological 
account must deny due to its insistence that religion is a 
phenomenon sui generis and is as such an autonomous and 
distinct realm of human belief and practice irreducible to any 
economic, psychological, linguistic, historical, or cultural 
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context. 
RELIGION IN HISTORY: 
I shall now sketch a socio-historical account that focuses on 
beliefs and practices relating to a spirit known locally as an 
engkanto. In this interpretation, the emphasis is not on the 
existence or non-existence of the engkanto – i.e., the truth 
or falsity of the belief in this spirit – nor on the relations 
between such beliefs and practices with pervasive cultural 
mechanisms. Rather, the focus is on the extent to which 
these beliefs and practices resonate with historically 
articulated, or perhaps better, post-colonial questions of 
identity, through exploring the meaningfulness of statements 
made by Filipinos about the engkanto, and the resonance of 
such statements with contemporary identity discourses in 
the Philippines. 
The engkanto are spirits whose domain of specialisation and 
modus operandi is the seduction and then possession of 
human subjects. The results of seduction and possession 
amount to a diminution of the self and the erasing of 
physical and mental individuality such that the one 
possessed can no longer be recognised. Typical symptoms 
of seduction and possession include conversing with 
invisible others, becoming stiff and going into a trance-like 
state, getting lost in the woods, acting violently towards 
family members and friends and memory loss.  
Tagálog healers claim that the self consists of seven 
aspects that must remain bound together if the integrity and 
identity of the self is to be maintained. Seduction and 
possession by an engkanto leads to the separation or loss 
or calling away of one or more of these aspects or strands of 
the non-material aspects of the self. Vulnerability to loss of 
identity resonates with local uses of amulets (antíng-antíng) 
that render the wearer invulnerable to either physical or 
spiritual harm. However, vulnerability to seduction also 
resonates with the complex history of a country that since 
1565 has been subject to Western influence and which, in 
more recent years, has made its most profitable export its 
own population who work the globe as seamen, dancers, 
hostesses, nannies, nurses, carers and teachers. As such, 
the trope of seduction is an important one, as are the 
testimonies of persons who say that they have been taken to 
the land of the engkanto: 
“Oral tradition portrays the world of the ingkanto as ideal; 
their life is an eternal feast. They live in modern cities, linked 
by an underground and water transportation system, as well 
as by air stations for their high powered cars, jet planes, 
luxury ships, and other spectacular vehicles.” <21> 
The apparent Westernisation of the land of the engkanto is 
critical, given that the engkanto is a spirit usually associated 
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with place: 
“The relationship between humans and spirits is governed 
by explicit rules, primarily regarding land use. After four 
hundred years of Christianity, the ingkanto are still believed 
to be the owners of the earth, and man must pay for its use. 
Humans must first ask their permission before cutting down 
their tree-abodes, burning their mountains, or destroying 
their anthills. In order to plant or build on their territory, or 
even to pass through it, one has to recite a formula or 
perform a ritual. According to native theory, failure to 
observe these rules will result in physiological illness, 
insanity, or death.” <22>  
These beliefs about the engkanto and land powerfully echo 
historical experiences, particularly those of rural Filipinos for 
whom history has meant, more or less, the loss of land. A 
steady process of impoverishment and disenfranchisement 
has been characterised by evictions, tenancy and 
unemployment. Government failure to initiate any 
meaningful programme of land reform, the persistence of 
practices such as illegal logging, land grabbing and 
widespread squatting indicates that land and rights of 
access to land are of central concern to contemporary 
Tagálogs and Filipinos living in both rural and urban areas.  
These beliefs also resonate strongly with local conceptions 
of illness (sakít) that may arise, according to local belief, 
through entering into proximity with persons of greater 
potency or power, while the fact that the engkanto is of 
Caucasian appearance further indicates the interpenetration 
of local notions of reciprocity and its possible disruption 
through contact with outsiders. Tan suggests that beliefs 
and practices concerning the activities of the engkanto and 
its Caucasian appearance is a “projection of asymmetrical 
social relationships” <23> and he quotes Lieban who 
suggests that these beliefs and practices “appear to support 
social equilibrium in the community by dramatising and 
reinforcing the idea that it is dangerous to covet alluring, but 
basically unattainable, wealth and power outside the 
barrios”. <24> Beliefs and practices relating to the activities 
of the engkanto do not only, then, reflect those processes 
through which Filipinos became a subject population to first 
Spanish and then American colonisers and, during the post-
colonial period, through which Filipinos have been displaced 
through economic out-migration, but also cultural practices 
and dynamics that conceptualise the possible negative 
consequences of moving into the orbit of persons and/or 
places of greater power or potency. 
If the engkanto are popularly thought to seduce, possess 
and dis-locate unwary subjects, they are also sometimes 
guilty, according to popular belief, of rape. A healer’s 
anecdote from his own casebook provides an insight into the 
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activities of the engkanto and discourses of identity in the 
contemporary Philippines: 
“The…engkanto, they rape our women and they become 
pregnant. And you know what is the result? It is the 
mongoloid. Retarded. And then I was being asked; ‘What is 
your proof?’ Look at the mongoloid – they have the same 
faces, the same look.” <25>  
The healer I interviewed had collected numerous newspaper 
cuttings of cases of possession he had been involved in 
treating. In Peoples Journal Tonight (April 5, 1994) an article 
entitled ‘Unseen Figures that Rape Men and Women’ 
referred specifically to the rape of several women by an 
engkanto who became pregnant and then gave birth to 
Down’s Syndrome babies. In another Peoples Journal 
Tonight article entitled ‘RP: Land of the 
Engkantos’ (undated), the engkanto were again held to be 
responsible for raping women, and the offspring from these 
unions were said to be “mongoloid babies [that] have 
international faces and appearances”.  
The fact that the activities of the engkanto should involve 
both the seduction and possession of individuals and the 
rape of women who then give birth to ‘retards’ with 
“international faces” has considerable resonance in a 
country with a long history under foreign political and 
economic control. What the activities of the engkanto 
expresses is an historically and culturally contingent malice 
that speaks of the deepest traumas of Tagálogs and 
Filipinos: it is a fear of historical and cultural dis-location, 
amnesia, disorder and loss. Localised in its sphere of 
operations and quite specific in its influence, it is a form of 
corporeal and spiritual violence that transforms its victims 
into entities with no knowledge of who they are or where 
they came from and which is thought to cause the birth of 
persons who all look alike and who bear no resemblance 
whatsoever to their parents. Likewise, it expresses profound 
concern about the potential disruption and/or liquidation of 
culturally coded ties of reciprocity. Finally, it indicates the 
feelings of powerlessness experienced primarily by poor 
urban and rural Tagálogs and Filipinos in their efforts to 
negotiate the profound collision of local culture with 
apparently anonymous and impersonal globalising economic 
and political processes.  
WHEN BELIEFS ARE FALSE: 
Rationalist accounts of religion typically measure the utility 
of religious beliefs against scientific accounts of ‘reality’. This 
approach is reminiscent of the intellectualist approach to 
religion taken by E. B. Tylor and J. G. Frazer. A rationalist 
approach to religion, however, need not be wedded to any 
speculative and indeed highly unlikely narrative of stages of 
development or progress, though it must remain committed 
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to the notion of a real world.  
Rationalist accounts of popular religious beliefs and 
practices in the Philippines are typically highly critical of 
those beliefs and practices on the grounds that they cause 
social violence and perpetuate false knowledge about health 
and sickness. For example, diseases and conditions such as 
tetanus infection, cholera, dysentery, strokes, chills and 
fevers are frequently attributed to the agency of malevolent 
spirits. Ramos’ account of what he calls Filipino “lower 
mythology” commences with a quote from the Manila Times 
(September 2, 1964) that, according to Ramos, details “how 
real the effects of the belief in witchcraft are in Philippine 
society”: <26>  
“A triple murder in the outskirts of the town of Pilar, Abra, a 
few days ago is worth noting for its implications on the state 
of education in the country. An elderly couple and their son 
were slain in what the authorities see as a “witch killing”. 
Such cases, although infrequent, are by no means rare. 
From time to time, innocent persons are assaulted or killed 
because they are suspected of having caused the illness or 
death of someone’s relative…the belief in witchcraft is still 
prevalent not only in the rural areas but in the towns as well. 
Progress in education is usually measured in terms of 
literacy percentages. Actually, the literacy rate is a poor 
guide in this respect, and it can be utterly misleading. It is 
not enough for the people to be able to read and write; more 
important, they should be freed from the grip of superstition.” 
<27>  
By beginning the book with this quotation, Ramos makes it 
clear that he does not intend simply to re-present Philippine 
folklore and mythology. Rather, Ramos is concerned with 
evaluating the contribution of local folklore to Philippine life 
and with presenting a systematic account of that folklore and 
mythology as a means of promoting its use in the classroom. 
Here, it may enhance artistic and creative pursuits while 
ensuring that practices associated with beliefs in 
mythological creatures and spirits and in witchcraft are 
challenged and shown to be without foundation, a project 
deemed necessary to improve standards of education and to 
enhance national solidarity. As such, a significant portion of 
the text is concerned with education, and the necessity of 
providing the requisite instruction in the classroom so that, 
for example, explanations of sickness in terms of the 
activities of malevolent spirits and witchcraft are replaced by 
scientific explanations: 
“The persistence of obsolete folk beliefs and practices is 
abetted by people’s believing that the creature fabricated by 
their imaginative forbears actually exist. Teachers of science 
and health should show that while these beliefs enrich men’s 
mental and emotional lives, they have no factual basis.” 
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<28>  
To this end, Appendix B of the book is entitled ‘Suggested 
Exercises to Counteract the Belief that Creatures of Lower 
Mythology Actually Exist’. <29> The appendix consists of a 
series of questions and exercises for teachers and students 
designed to draw a distinction between empirical reality and 
reality as it is portrayed in myth and folklore.  
Ramos’ account relies rather heavily on a distinction 
between two kinds of knowledge: a rational-scientific corpus 
of statements and propositions that are held to accurately 
describe reality and which encourage forms of social action 
that are efficacious precisely because of that 
correspondence, and a religious or traditional corpus of 
knowledge which while signifying a cultural richness that 
must be preserved, is out of synch with the real. Its proper 
place is therefore the library and museum as it cannot serve 
as an effective guide for living. This opposition highlights a 
central problem in the study of religions: are the statements 
and claims of co-researchers to be interpreted as threads in 
a web of meanings whose sense derives from the fact that 
they are embedded in specific forms of life, or, is there a 
need for some principle of verification in order to measure or 
evaluate such statements and claims? <30> 
Advocates of the phenomenological approach to religion 
would no doubt argue that Ramos’ account is at best 
uncharitable and at worst unethical, precisely because of its 
orientation towards generating cognitive change in the 
believer and the general objective of transforming local 
myths and folklore into state or national property. Yet, 
Ramos clearly demonstrates – and my own research in the 
environs of Mount Banahaw supports this – that Filipinos are 
broadly ignorant of basic standards of health and nutrition 
and their links to disease and ill-health. Surely, the ethical 
response to this situation is precisely to challenge beliefs 
when and where they clearly obstruct or prevent people from 
understanding the causes of sickness. In which case, for 
analysis to cease at the believer’s point of view as 
phenomenologists of religion suggest emerges not as 
ethical, sympathetic or empathic, but as the abdication of 
responsibility towards those whom one is engaged in 
representing. What this means in practice is that the study of 
religions must be interested in the meaningfulness of 
statements, but must surely direct particular attention to any 
hiatus between such statements and reality.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
In this essay I have argued against the phenomenology of 
religion on two fronts: firstly, that the phenomenological 
commitment to religion as sui generis is, in effect, a denial of 
context. As such, I tried to demonstrate the depth that can 
be attained through contextualisation, arguing that 
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contextualisation enriches rather than reduces the 
description and analysis of religions. Secondly, I tried to 
show that the phenomenological commitment to the epochē, 
a commitment to study religion without prejudice and to 
privilege the believer’s point of view, does not in fact 
guarantee the end of prejudice but just as likely its 
furtherance precisely because of the uncritical approach 
adopted towards the believer. It is my hope that this essay 
encourages, on the one hand, greater inter-disciplinarity in 
the study of religions and, on the other, hastens the 
abandonment of out-dated methodological concepts that 
have stifled rather than generated theoretical debate in the 
field. 
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